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Abstract
This dissertation studies the effects of government policy on aggregate productivity by
studying how government policy affects the allocation of resources across firms. Chapter 1
describes the data used in the following chapters. importantly, this data set is a plant level
census of the manufacturing sector in Chile which allows to study government policy while
taking into consideration firm heterogeneity.
Chapter 2 was written jointly with Fausto Patiño Peña. It quantifies the effect of effective
corporate tax rates on aggregate TFP through allocative efficiency. First, using the data
described in Chapter 1 for the years 1998 to 2007 several characteristics of the effective
tax rate distribution are documented. Two important findings are a large dispersion in the
effective tax rate faced by firms and a mass of firms with a 0 percent tax rate. Next, these
features are incorporated into a standard monopolistic competition model with capital and
output wedges, where firms endogenously choose the tax rate they face. The model is then
calibrated and the main finding is that if there were no corporate taxes in the economy,
TFP would increase between 4 and 11 percent. Afterward, the effects of imposing the same
tax rate on all firms are studied. A monotonically decreasing relationship between the level
of the flat tax rate and TFP is found.
Finally, Chapter 3 studies the interaction between financial frictions and firing costs and
its effects on allocative efficiency and aggregate productivity. In particular, it quantifies the
effect on aggregate productivity of an improvement in financial development in economies
with firing costs. To do this, a small open economy model with heterogeneous firms that face
collateral constraints and have to pay firing costs is developed. The model is then calibrated
using the data described in Chapter 1. The main finding is that aggregate productivity
increases by 2.5 percent following a financial reform that makes Chile’s level of financial
development comparable to that of the United Kingdom.
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1 Encuesta Industrial Nacional Anual: Plant Level Cen-
sus Data from Chile
1.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the annual census of the Chilean manufacturing sector. This data set
is used in the following chapters. Previous versions of this data set have been used extensively
throughout different streams of economic literature.1 This data set is very complete and has
the potential to exploit different levels of firm heterogeneity and its effects on the economy
as a whole. In this dissertation it is used to measure how different government polices affect
the allocation of resources.
1.2 The Annual Census of the Chilean Manufacturing Sector: ENIA
The ENIA (Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual) is an annual census of the Chilean manu-
facturing sector. This data set is an unbalanced panel that covers all manufacturing plants
with more than 10 employees and plants with less than 10 employees that belong to firms
with multiple establishments. The current available version comprises the periods from 1995
to 2017. However, the data set only has a panel structure for the periods 1995 to 2007. After
2007 firms cannot be linked across time.
The ENIA collects data on revenue, net accounting profit, profit tax, employment, wage
bill, fixed assets, hours worked classified by type of worker, severance payments for certain
years, as well as other balance sheet variables. importantly, the data set has ISIC Rev 3.1
classification by industry up to the fourth digit and comes with a set of industry deflators
both for gross revenue and intermediate inputs.
One of the main advantages of this data set is that it includes small firms as well as
large firms and most firms are private. Table 1 shows the share of firms by plant size for
selected years of the data set. The total number of plants ranges between 3,919 and 4,726.
Between 1998 and 2007, plants with 10 to 49 workers accounted for 60 percent of the total
number of establishments, on average. Plants with 0 to 9 workers, 50 to 199 workers, and
200+ workers had an average participation share in the total number of firms of 9 percent,
1Different years of this data set have been used in several well-known studies, such as Liu (1993), Levin-
sohn and Petrin (2003), Oberfield (2013), Petrin and Sivadasan (2011), and Asker et al. (2014).
1
23 percent, and 8 percent, respectively. It should be noted that plants with 0 to 9 workers
are underrepresented in this data set since the only plants with 0 to 9 employees included
are the ones that belong to firms with multiple establishments.
Table 1: Number of Plants and Shares in Total Plants by Size Class
Year
Number of
Plants
0 - 9 employees
10 - 49
employees
50 - 199
employees
200+ employees
1998 4,530 0.02 0.65 0.25 0.08
1999 4,052 0.06 0.64 0.23 0.07
2000 3,998 0.07 0.64 0.22 0.07
2001 4,214 0.11 0.60 0.21 0.08
2002 4,576 0.11 0.61 0.21 0.07
2003 4,509 0.10 0.60 0.22 0.08
2004 4,726 0.09 0.61 0.22 0.08
2005 4,461 0.11 0.56 0.24 0.09
2006 4,183 0.11 0.55 0.25 0.09
2007 3,919 0.10 0.54 0.25 0.11
1.3 Conclusion
The ENIA is a very complete plant level data set that represents all plants in the manufac-
turing sector in Chile with more than ten employees. This makes it great tool to evaluate
how government policy affects firms depending on their specific characteristics and quantify
the impact of these changes on the aggregate economy. On the next two chapters, I use this
data set to analyze fiscal policy, as well as labor and financial policies. More details of this
data set will be added in the specific chapters below.
2
2 Corporate Tax Rates, Allocative Efficiency, and Ag-
gregate Productivity
2.1 Introduction
Corporate tax regulation generates heterogeneity in the effective tax rates faced by firms
due to exemptions, deductions, and deferrals. At the same time, there is a large amount of
dispersion in firm-level productivity even within narrowly defined industries. As a result,
effective corporate tax rates can potentially generate an inefficient allocation of resources
across firms, which directly affects total factor productivity (TFP).
This chapter quantifies the effect of effective corporate tax rates on aggregate TFP
through allocative efficiency. First, we use Chilean manufacturing census data for the years
1998 to 2007 and document several characteristics of the effective tax rate distribution. Two
important findings are a large dispersion in the effective tax rate faced by firms and a mass
of firms with a 0 percent tax rate. Next, we incorporate these features into a standard
monopolistic competition model with capital and output wedges, where firms endogenously
choose the tax rate they face. We then calibrate the model and find that if there were no
corporate taxes in the economy, TFP would increase between 4 and 11 percent. Afterward,
we study the effects of imposing the same tax rate on all firms, which we call a flat tax rate
policy. We find a monotonically decreasing relationship between the level of the flat tax
rate and TFP.
The chapter contributes mostly to the misallocation literature pioneered by Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). This stream of literature documents
large differences in TFP through the resource allocation channel. Following the categoriza-
tion proposed in the survey by Restuccia and Rogerson (2017), the literature has studied
misallocation via two approaches. The direct approach selects a factor that can potentially
cause misallocation and measures its effects on allocative efficiency and TFP. Examples of
such factors are financial frictions, firing costs, and size-dependent policies. The indirect ap-
proach tries to measure the net effect of all the possible factors that generate misallocation
without specifying a definite source. One caveat with this approach is that any misspecifi-
cation of the theoretical model used to measure misallocation can potentially overstate it.
We combine these two approaches by identifying a specific factor of misallocation, effective
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corporate tax rates, while also accounting for all other possible latent factors that could
generate misallocation or model misspecification. By taking this approach, we are able to
study the effect of heterogeneous effective corporate tax rates while accounting for any other
distortion or model misspecification.
To carry out our analysis, we use the data set described in Chapter 1, for the time period
1998-2007. Importantly, this data set it specifies net after-tax firm income and corporate
taxes paid by firms. We use these two variables to construct the average effective tax rates
faced by firms, which is essential for our analysis. The advantage of this effective tax rate
measure is that it summarizes all the subtleties of the tax code into one measure. One
drawback is that there may be endogeneity between firm choices and characteristics and the
firm specific tax rate. We perform several exercises to address this drawback and find that
our results do not change.
To study the impact of firm-specific corporate tax rates on TFP, we develop a small
open economy model where firms are heterogeneous in their productivity. Firms can choose
whether to face a positive exogenous tax and have non-negative accounting profits or face a
0 percent tax and have non-positive accounting profits. This feature incorporates a specific
exemption present in the Chilean tax code, which establishes that firms with non-positive
profits face a corporate tax rate of 0 percent. This exemption is relevant since it affects
around 20 percent of firms in our sample. By modeling this exemption, we intend to par-
tially address the concern that firms’ behavior can affect their effective tax rate. We also
introduce firm-specific capital and output wedges to account for all other distortions and
model misspecification. If we did not explicitly model the corporate tax rate, it would be
accounted for by the capital and output wedges. By introducing it, we are stripping away
its contribution to the wedges.
Using the data described above, we back out the capital and output wedges necessary to
rationalize firms’ observed choices of inputs. We then take these wedges as primitives and
measure the change in aggregate output of implementing different flat tax policies relative
to the observed tax policy. Last, we measure how much of this output change is generated
by intrasectoral allocative efficiency, intersectoral reallocation of resources, and changes in
the demand of resources. We define the contribution of intrasectoral allocative efficiency to
the change in aggregate output as the TFP gap.
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We find that if corporate taxes are removed, there is a positive TFP gap ranging from
4 to 11 percentage points, depending on the year analyzed. Moreover, this gap decreases
monotonically with the level of the flat tax rate and becomes negative after a threshold that
varies with the year. We conclude that as the tax level increases, more resources are going to
less productive firms. We also find that the revenue-neutral flat tax policy generates small
changes in TFP. The contribution to the change in aggregate output of the intersectoral
component is small relative to the TFP gap in every year and policy analyzed. Last, we
perform several robustness checks to reinforce our results.
This chapter is related to an ongoing literature that tries to identify the main drivers of
misallocation of resources and its effects on TFP.2 One factor analyzed in many studies is
financial development. Examples of these studies are Midrigan and Xu (2014) and Gopinath
et al. (2017). The quantitative impact of this factor on aggregate TFP varies depending on
the study. For example, Midrigan and Xu (2014) find that the effect is at most 10 percent
in South Korea. Gopinath et al. (2017) document an increase in capital misallocation in the
south of Europe and find that financial frictions can explain this fact. The effect on TFP
is around 3 percent. Another possible source of misallocation is firing costs. Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993) find that imposing a one-year firing cost in the United States would
lead to a 2 percent drop in TFP. This drop is due to the misallocation of labor across
firms and changes in the establishment productivity distribution. We contribute to this
literature by studying how the dispersion and level of corporate tax rates affect aggregate
productivity. Moreover, we do this by using a direct measure of this friction. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to measure the effects of effective corporate tax
rates on TFP through allocative efficiency at the firm level.
A strand of the literature argues that the dispersion in marginal products is a reflection
of specific characteristics of the economic environment. David et al. (2016) study how
information frictions show up as dispersion in marginal products. In their framework, firms
face imperfect information when they make their input decisions and find losses in aggregate
productivity for the United States, China, and India. Other environment specifications that
yield dispersion in marginal revenue products are adjustment costs of capital, multiple
production technologies, and different demand specifications.3 Although these restrictions
2See Hopenhayn (2014) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2017) for a recent survey of this literature.
3Asker et al. (2014) find that adjustment costs can generate dispersion in marginal revenue products.
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could generate dispersion, they do not imply misallocation, as a benevolent planner would
face these same physical constraints when allocating resources. In our study, we take these
factors into account by allowing corporate tax rates to interact with firm-specific output
and capital wedges. These wedges are a reduced form of controlling for all frictions and
model misspecification not accounted for in our theoretical framework.
Finally, this chapter contributes to the broad literature that studies the effects of effec-
tive corporate tax rates in macroeconomic aggregates. This literature mainly studies how
corporate taxes affect investment and entrepreneurship. The general finding is that corpo-
rate taxation has significant adverse effects on both investment and entrepreneurship.4 One
study that analyzes the Chilean economy is Hsieh and Parker (2007). The authors argue
that the main cause of the investment boom in Chile in the last part of the eighties and
nineties was due to a tax reform from 1984 through 1986 that cut the tax rate of retained
profits from 50 percent to 10 percent. While these papers focus on investment and growth,
our analysis is on the allocative effects of corporate tax rates.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we document facts
on the effective corporate tax rate distribution in Chile. section 3 describes the theoretical
framework used in our analysis and specifies the calibration of parameters. We perform
our quantitative analysis in section 4. In section 5 we perform sensitivity analysis on the
parameters chosen. section 6 deals with caveats that may arise from our measurement of
firm-specific effective tax rates. Last, we make concluding remarks in section 7.
2.2 Profit Tax in Chile
This section describes the data used in our paper and presents facts about the effective
corporate tax rate distribution in Chile.
2.2.1 Data
The data used is the one described in Chapter 1. We use data for the period 1998-2007, as
there were no reforms to the Chilean tax code in this time frame, except for pre-stipulated
increases in the statutory tax rate. Table 2 shows the statutory tax rate for each year in
Rossbach and Asturias (2017) analyze the impact of multiple production technologies on the dispersion of
marginal products using the same data set used in our analysis. Haltiwanger et al. (2018) analyze how
different demand specifications can show up as dispersion in revenue TFP.
4See Djankov et al. (2010) and the references within.
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our sample. After 2007, the ENIA’s panel structure is eliminated, so that firms cannot be
identified across years. For this reason, we do not use data after 2007, as doing so would
have limited some of our quantitative exercises.
In Chile, the manufacturing sector accounted for roughly 17 percent of value added and
14 percent of employment for the period 1998-2007. Further details on the construction and
representativeness of our sample can be found in section A.1 of the appendix.
2.2.2 Profit Tax Facts in Chile
In this section, we document relevant tax facts about Chile. In Chile, all firms are subject
to the same statutory tax rate, regardless of their level of profits. The ENIA collects plant-
level data on net accounting profits and profit tax expenses. Using these two variables, we
calculate the effective tax rate that each firm faces in a given year, as the ratio between
profit tax expenses and gross accounting profits.5 For the years of our sample, the statutory
tax rate increased from 15 percent to 17 percent. The effective profit tax rate that firms
face has considerable dispersion, as seen in Table 2. This dispersion is generated by several
exemptions outlined in the Chilean tax law, as well as fines for late payments and tax base
revaluations to match economic activity with financial payments.
An important feature of the distribution of effective tax rates in Chile is that, on average,
30 percent of firms face a 0 percent tax rate. This feature is mainly driven by the tax code
exemption that specifies that firms with non-positive accounting profits face a corporate tax
rate equal to 0 percent.6 We also document that 75 percent of plants have an effective tax
rate below or equal to the statutory tax rate, as can be seen in Table 2.
A plant may face an effective tax rate lower than the statutory tax rate because of loss
carryforward, tax base revaluations, and other exemptions. Plants that face an effective
tax rate that is higher than the statutory tax rate do so mainly for two reasons: late
payment fines and tax base revaluations. Late payment fines range from 10 percent to 30
percent depending on how long it takes the plant to pay the amount owed. Plants also
pay 1.5 percent interest per month on their debt. Taxes paid by tax base revaluations are
technically called “deferred taxes”. These tax base revaluations arise from analyzing the
differences, mostly temporary, between taxable and accounting profit.
5Gross accounting profits is the sum of profit tax expenses and net accounting profits.
6On average, 18 percent of the firms in our sample have non-positive profits.
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Table 2: Distribution of Effective Profit Tax Rates (percent)
Year
Statutory
Tax Rate
25th
percentile
50th
percentile
75th
percentile
90th
percentile
Standard
Deviation
1998 15 0 12.14 15.78 25.79 13.95
1999 15 0 12.03 15.63 24.81 13.90
2000 15 0 10.95 15.04 22.98 12.87
2001 15 0 9.69 15.01 22.06 12.79
2002 16 0 8.68 16.00 21.10 12.56
2003 16.5 0 11.31 16.58 23.19 13.44
2004 17 0 13.45 17.00 22.97 12.52
2005 17 0 14.08 17.02 22.76 12.86
2006 17 0 14.53 17.20 23.58 12.76
2007 17 0 13.99 17.11 24.08 13.19
The last column of Table 2 presents the standard deviation of corporate tax rates for
every year of our sample. To address the issue that the dispersion in tax rates may be
driven by tax exemptions targeted at firms with a specific characteristic, we decompose the
variance of corporate tax rates into within-group and between-group components. We group
firms by observables provided in the ENIA, such as size, region, industry, and business entity
type. Table 3 shows the average share of the within- and between-group components of the
variance of corporate tax rates. For all group categorizations considered, the within-group
component accounts for more than 97 percent of the total variance.
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Table 3: Variance Decomposition of Corporate Taxes (percent)
Observable: Within-Group Component Between-Group Component
Size by Employment 98.79 1.21
Size by Sales 98.54 1.46
Size by Value Added 98.55 1.45
Region 99.15 0.85
Business Entity Type 97.14 2.86
Industry 98.77 1.23
Notes. This table portrays the share of the within-group and between-group components of the variance averaged for the period
1998-2007. Size categories for employment, sales, and value added are according to the standard categorization of the ENIA. There
are 9 groups for employment and 10 groups for sales and value added. Firms are classified into 12 region groups and 8 types of
business entities. Last, we group firms by two-digit industries according to the ISIC Rev. 3 industry classification.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
This section develops the theoretical framework that will allow us to evaluate the effect
of corporate profit tax rates on resource allocations and its impact on TFP. We set up a
standard monopolistic competition model with firm-specific output and capital wedges and
firm-specific profit tax rates. We then explain the calibration of key parameters and the
measurement of the variables that will be used in our quantitative analysis.
2.3.1 Monopolistic Competition Model
We consider a static monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms. We assume
a small open economy with inelastic aggregate labor supply L¯. There is a single final
good Y produced by a representative firm in a perfectly competitive output market. The
representative firm’s production function is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator, and it uses output
Ys of industries s ∈ {1, ..., S} as inputs:
Y =
S∏
s=1
Y θss ,
S∑
s=1
θs = 1, (1)
and Ps is the price of industry s.
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Industry output is a CES aggregator of Ms differentiated products with elasticity pa-
rameter σ:
Ys =
(
Ms∑
i=1
Y
σ−1
σ
si
) σ
σ−1
. (2)
Differentiated product firms are heterogeneous in their physical productivity, Asi. Their
production function is given by
Ysi = AsiKαssi L
1−αs
si , (3)
where Ksi and Lsi are the capital and labor inputs, respectively, and αs is the capital share
of industry s.
These firms maximize economic profit, which is the sum of accounting profit and the
opportunity cost of capital. We make this distinction since corporate tax rates directly affect
accounting profits. Note that in the data, a firm’s tax rate is obtained as the product of the
statutory tax rate and the tax base. A firm’s tax base is a function of its accounting profits
and the exemptions, deductions, and deferrals specified by the tax code. One exemption
that we model explicitly is that firms with non-positive accounting profits face a 0 percent
tax.
We model this exemption as follows. If a firm’s accounting profit is non-negative, then
the firm faces a profit tax rate, which we denote as tsi. This tax rate is exogenous and taken
as given by the firm. On the other hand, if a firm has non-positive accounting profit, then its
effective tax rate is equal to 0. Hence, a firm must choose whether to face a positive profit
tax rate tsi and have non-negative accounting profit or a 0 profit tax rate with non-positive
accounting profit.
Given this, the firm’s problem is to maximize economic profit:
pisi = max
{
pitsi, pi
0
si
}
,
where pitsi is the economic profit of a firm that faces profit tax rate tsi, conditioned on non-
negative accounting profit, and pi0si is the economic profit of a firm that faces a profit tax of
0, conditioned on non-positive accounting profit. We express accounting profit as
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piAsi = PsiYsi − wLsi − (δ + λr)Ksi + Γsi, (4)
where λ is the fraction of capital that is financed by debt and Γsi is non-operational income
net of non-operational costs.7
If a firm faces profit tax rate tsi, economic profit pitsi is
pitsi = max{Ksi, Lsi}
piAsi (1− tsi)− τ˜Y siPsiYsi − (1− λ) rKsi − τ˜Ksi (r + δ)Ksi
s.t. piAsi ≥ 0
(
µtsi
)
,
where µtsi is the Lagrange multiplier for the accounting profit’s non-negativity constraint.
Maximization yields the following first-order conditions:
MRPKsi ≡ αsσ − 1
σ
PsiYsi
Ksi
= r (1− λtsi + τ˜Ksi + λµ
t
si) + δ (1− tsi + τ˜Ksi + µtsi)
1− tsi − τ˜Y si + µtsi
, (5)
MRPLsi ≡ (1− αs) σ − 1
σ
PsiYsi
Lsi
= w (1− tsi + µ
t
si)
1− tsi − τ˜Y si + µtsi
. (6)
If a firm faces profit tax rate 0, economic profit pi0si is
pi0si = max{Ksi, Lsi}
piAsi − τ˜Y siPsiYsi − (1− λ) rKsi − τ˜Ksi (r + δ)Ksi
s.t. piAsi ≤ 0
(
µ0si
)
,
where µ0si is the Lagrange multiplier for the accounting profit’s non-positivity constraint.
Maximization yields the following first-order conditions:
7The parameter λ is exogenous and constant across firms in our quantitative analysis. Γsi allows us to
match accounting profits in the model to those in the data. We assume that it is firm specific and does not
depend on the input choices of the firm.
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MRPKsi ≡ αsσ − 1
σ
PsiYsi
Ksi
=
r
(
1 + τ˜Ksi − λµ0si
)
+ δ
(
1 + τ˜Ksi − µ0si
)
1− τ˜Y si − µ0si
, (7)
MRPLsi ≡ (1− αs) σ − 1
σ
PsiYsi
Lsi
=
w
(
1− µ0si
)
1− τ˜Y si − µ0si
. (8)
Similar to Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Foster et al. (2008), we define revenue-based
factor productivity as TFPRsi ≡ PsiAsi. Under a Cobb-Douglas production function, this
can be expressed as
TFPRsi =
σ
σ − 1
(
MRPKsi
αs
)αs (MRPLsi
1− αs
)1−αs
. (9)
From equations (5)-(8), we observe that firms’ marginal products differ when they face
different wedges and profit tax rates. Importantly, we assume that tax rates do not affect
capital and output wedges. However, the tax rate interacts with the wedges in the marginal
products of the firm. If we were to set wedges and taxes to zero, then all firms would
have the same marginal products. Given this, equation (9) shows that revenue productivity
would also equalize across firms. On the contrary, when firms face different wedges and
profit taxes, there is dispersion in revenue productivity. Furthermore, firms with higher
TFPRsi are those that have higher wedges, raising their marginal products and lowering
their capital, labor, and output levels.
The industry-weighted average of firms’ revenue productivity, marginal product of capi-
tal, and marginal product of labor are denoted as TFPRs, MRPKs, and MRPLs, respec-
tively. Using the above framework, we construct the aggregate measures for capital, labor,
TFP, and output. First, we express the equilibrium allocations for sectoral resources, Ks
and Ls, as
Ks =
Ms∑
i=1
Ksi = K · ωKs , (10)
Ls =
Ms∑
i=1
Lsi = L · ωLs , (11)
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whereK =
∑S
s=1Ks is aggregate capital, L =
∑S
s=1 Ls is aggregate labor, ωKs is the sectoral
share of capital, and ωLs is the sectoral share of labor. Sectoral shares have the following
expression:
ωKs =
αsθs/MRPKs∑S
s′=1 αs′θs′/MRPKs′
(12)
ωLs =
(1− αs) θs/MRPLs∑S
s′=1 (1− αs′) θs′/MRPLs′
. (13)
We derive industry productivity as
TFPs =
[
Ms∑
i=1
(
Asi
TFPRs
TFPRsi
)σ−1] 1σ−1
. (14)
Last, aggregate output can be expressed as a function of Ks, Ls, and TFPs:
Y =
S∏
s=1
(
TFPs ·Kαss · L(1−αs)s
)θs
. (15)
2.3.2 Measurement and Calibration
We use the data described in section 2.2.1 to calibrate the parameters of our model and
measure firms’ marginal revenue products and revenue productivities. Industries in the
model correspond to the four-digit industries within the manufacturing sector according
to the ISIC Rev. 3 industry classification. We measure firms’ value added, PsiYsi, as
the difference between gross revenue and intermediate inputs. We use four-digit industry
deflators for gross revenue and intermediate inputs, provided by the data set, to deflate our
estimate of firms’ value added. Industry value added, PsYs, is measured as the sum of all
firms’ value added within industry s. The capital input, Ksi, is measured as the book value
of fixed assets, which we deflate using the gross revenue deflators. To control for differences
in human capital, hour requirements, and rent sharing across plants, we follow Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) and use the wage bill deflated by the intermediate input industry deflator
as the measure for labor, Lsi. In a robustness check, we also consider hours worked for our
measure of labor.8
8Due to data availability, we only carry out this analysis for the period 2001-2007.
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As described above, we calculate effective tax rates as the ratio between a firm’s profit
taxes and its gross accounting profits. We denote the measured firm-specific effective tax
rate as tˆsi. Two things should be noted. First, we use average effective tax rates as marginal
effective tax rates. The main advantage of following this method is that all exemptions and
deductions of the tax code are embedded in our measure. Hence, we do not have to model
the intricate details of the tax code. The main drawback of our approach is that the observed
tax rate is potentially endogenous to certain firms’ characteristics and past behavior. We
conduct several robustness checks to verify that our results are not driven by other specific
characteristics and behavior of the firm.
We set the rental rate of capital to r = 0.05 and the depreciation rate to δ = 0.05, to make
our results comparable with other papers in the literature. The elasticity of substitution
between varieties is fixed at σ = 3, so that firms’ price is 50 percent higher than their
marginal cost. In section 2.5.1, we evaluate the sensitivity of our results with respect to
these assumptions. The capital share αs in industry s is equal to 1 minus the labor share
in that corresponding industry for the United States.9 These shares are obtained from the
NBER Productivity Database.10
Using the data and parameter values described above, we back out the capital and output
wedges in the following manner. For firms with positive accounting profits, we use equations
(5) and (6) to obtain the firm-specific wedges. Since µtsi = 0, the output and capital wedges
are
(1 + τKsi) =
αs
(1− αs)
wLsi
(r + δ)Ksi
(
1− tˆsi
)
+
(δ + λr)
(
tˆsi
)
(r + δ) , (16)
(1− τY si) = σ
σ − 1
wLsi
(1− αs)PsiYsi
(
1− tˆsi
)
+ tˆsi. (17)
On the other hand, for firms with negative accounting profits the capital and output wedges
are obtained from equations (7) and (8). In this case, µ0si = 0 and the wedges are11
9Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we set the capital shares for each industry equal to those of the
United Sstates as we suppose that the US economy is less distorted than Chile’s economy.
10Most data on firm labor payments do not include labor benefits such as social security contributions.
In the same manner as Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we scale each industry’s labor share by 3/2.
11We cannot identify the capital and output wedges for firms that have accounting profits equal to 0, as we
do not observe µ0si in the data. We assume these firms face a tax rate of 0 and use equations (18) and (19) to
back out the wedges. Although these wedges are mismeasured, this assumption only ameliorates the impact
of corporate tax rates on resource allocation, as it gives more explanatory power to the output and capital
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(1 + τKsi) =
αs
(1− αs)
wLsi
(r + δ)Ksi
, (18)
(1− τY si) = σ
σ − 1
wLsi
(1− αs)PsiYsi . (19)
Last, we use equations (3) and (9) to calculate firms’ physical productivity, Asi, and revenue
productivity, TFPRsi, respectively. Using equations (10)-(15), we construct industry and
aggregate measures of output, productivity, capital, and labor.
2.4 Misallocation and Corporate Taxes
In this section, we use the framework developed above to analyze the impact of effective tax
rates on allocative efficiency. First, we define the output gap as the change in output between
two economies characterized by different wedges and tax policy, but holding the distribution
of firm productivities constant. Then, we consider counterfactual tax policies and measure
the implied output gap relative to the observed distribution of tax rates. We decompose
this measure to analyze the effect on allocative efficiency of the observed effective tax rates.
Finally, we analyze what happens with government revenue in our different counterfactuals.
2.4.1 Output Gap Decomposition
To study the impact of different tax policies, it is convenient to define the output gap
between two economies that only differ in the wedges and effective tax rates each firm faces.
We decompose this gap into five objects: the TFP gap, intersectoral capital reallocation,
intersectoral labor reallocation, change in aggregate capital, and change in aggregate labor.
The TFP gap reflects intrasectoral reallocation, as can be seen from equations (9) and (14).
Capital and labor intersectoral reallocation are also affected by tax rates and wedges since
the industry shares of capital and labor, ωK and ωL, are a function of firms’ marginal
products. Finally, aggregate capital demand changes for different tax rates and wedges
through the marginal cost of capital. Note that by assumption, the aggregate demand on
wedges. Hence, our measure of the impact of effective tax rates on allocative efficiency is conservative. Firms
with gross accounting profits equal to 0 only represent between 2 and 8 percent of the sample for the period
analyzed.
15
labor will not change since we have assumed a fixed aggregate labor supply.
Consider two economies that have different firm-specific output and capital wedges and
profit tax rates but are equal in all other aspects. Denote the levels of output of these two
economies by Y and Y˜ . We refer to the output gap as the log percentage difference between
these two levels of output. Using equations (10), (11), and (15), the output gap can be
decomposed as follows:
log
(
Y
Y˜
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Output Gap
=
S∑
s=1
θslog
(
TFPs
˜TFPs
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
TFP Gap
+
S∑
s=1
αsθslog
(
ωKs
ω˜Ks
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intersectoral Capital Reallocation
+
S∑
s=1
(1− αs) θslog
(
ωLs
ω˜Ls
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intersectoral Labor Reallocation
+
S∑
s=1
αsθslog
(
K
K˜
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Aggregate Capital
+
S∑
s=1
(1− αs) θslog
(
L
L˜
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Aggregate Labor
. (20)
Below, we analyze different counterfactual tax rates policies and compare them to the
distribution of tax rates observed in the data.
2.4.2 Output Gap Decomposition and Corporate Taxes
In this section, we quantify the output gap decomposition using equation (20). We consider
two economies that differ only in the tax policy implemented. Both economies are subject to
the same firm-specific output and capital wedges. By doing this, we ensure that firms face
the same frictions and model misspecification implied by the data in both economies. In
one economy, we set taxes to tsi = 0, and in the other economy, we set taxes to the observed
firm-specific profit tax rates, tsi = tˆsi. This measures the change in output implied by
modifying the actual Chilean tax policy to one with no corporate taxation, allowing us to
quantify the effect of the dispersion and level of the observed tax rates on TFP.
Table 4 presents the results from the output gap decomposition. Moving to a counter-
factual scenario with no corporate tax rates generates an increase in output that ranges
from 20 percent to 38 percent, depending on the year considered. In all of the years ana-
lyzed, TFP increases due to the policy change. This increase ranges from 4 percent to 11
percent and is due to a more efficient intrasectoral allocation of resources. The effect on
intersectoral reallocation is small. Intersectoral allocation of capital accounts for between
-3 percent and 2 percent of the change in output. In three years, the effect of intersectoral
allocation of capital is negative. Intersectoral allocation of labor increases in all years but
only between 0 percent and 2 percent. Most of the change in the output gap is generated
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by large increases in the demand for aggregate capital. This is an implication of the small
open economy assumption of the model. Setting tsi = 0 directly changes the cost of capital,
which in this case generates large inflows of capital into the economy.
Table 4: Output gap decomposition: tsi = 0 (percent)
Year Output Gap TFP Gap
Intersectoral
K
Intersectoral
L
∆Aggregate
Capital
1998 20.00 5.47 1.32 1.38 11.82
1999 21.20 6.43 0.41 1.05 13.31
2000 28.46 8.22 1.60 0.95 17.69
2001 22.79 5.64 0.10 0.72 16.33
2002 19.60 4.52 0.61 0.34 14.14
2003 19.85 4.82 0.03 0.55 14.45
2004 22.30 4.16 -0.41 0.80 17.75
2005 31.20 4.33 -2.94 1.74 28.07
2006 35.29 6.83 0.06 1.53 26.86
2007 38.02 11.12 -0.55 1.31 26.14
2.4.3 Allocative Efficiency and Corporate Tax Rates
In this section, we analyze how different levels of tax rates affect our economy by considering
different counterfactual flat tax rate policies. The equations implied by the model portray
the mechanisms through which intrasectoral reallocation of resources occurs due to different
tax policies. Profit tax rates affect firms’ marginal products, as can be seen from equations
(5)-(8). Since profit tax rates interact with firm-level wedges, flat tax rate policies will have
heterogeneous effects.
Our counterfactual exercise is the following. We set the corporate tax rate equal to t¯
for all firms (i.e., tsi = t¯ ∀i). In these counterfactual scenarios, all firms face the same
output and capital wedges implied by the data as well as a flat tax rate t¯. We compare
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these counterfactual economies to the observed Chilean economy and measure changes in
allocative efficiency with respect to the data.
Figure 1: Relationship between TFP Gap and t¯ (2003)
The schedule in Figure 1 portrays the TFP gap between a counterfactual scenario with
tsi = t¯ and the observed Chilean economy tsi = tˆsi, for different levels of t¯, in the year 2003.
This graph shows that the TFP gap decreases monotonically with the level of the tax rate,
t¯. This is the case for all the years studied in our sample. Furthermore, for lower levels of
t¯, the TFP gap is positive (TFP gains), while for higher levels of t¯, this TFP gap becomes
negative (TFP loss). In 2003, a flat tax rate policy of t¯ = 0.0976 would have generated the
same aggregate TFP level as the one implied by the observed firm-specific corporate tax
rates. This flat tax rate is lower than 16.5 percent, which was the statutory tax rate for
that year. If in 2003 Chile had applied a flat tax rate policy at the statutory tax rate level
without any exemptions and distortions, the loss in TFP would have been 2.46 percent.
This remark is consistent for all the years in our sample.
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Figure 2: Change in Dispersion Measures Relative to t¯ (2003)
Notes: The change in dispersion for revenue productivity is measured as the log difference between the standard deviation of revenue
productivity implied by the flat tax rate policy and the standard deviation of revenue productivity implied by the observed tax rates.
The same statistic is calculated for marginal revenue products.
The monotonically decreasing relationship between the level of flat tax rates and the TFP
gap can be explained as follows. For very small levels of flat tax rates, the dispersion in firms’
marginal products and, hence, revenue productivity is lower. This has clear implications
for aggregate TFP, as less dispersion in revenue productivity results in higher TFP. We can
observe this mechanism in Figure 2, which shows the dispersion in marginal products and
revenue productivity for counterfactual policy scenarios tsi = t¯ relative to the dispersion in
these measures in the data. As the level of the tax rate increases, the relative dispersion
increases for both marginal products and revenue productivity. Intuitively, as the level
increases, the profit tax rate amplifies the effects of the distortions and misspecification
embedded in the output and capital wedges. As a result, dispersion in marginal products
and revenue productivity increases, generating a lower TFP gap. This is the result of
resources being allocated toward less productive firms within a sector.12
12As a robustness check, we measure misallocation as in Olley and Pakes (1996) using our model outcomes.
We find that the correlation of firm productivity with respect to both capital and labor shares within a sector
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To corroborate our results, we perform an alternative measure of allocative efficiency
similar to Olley and Pakes (1996). Our results are summarized in Figure 3. In Panel (a),
the schedule labeled “Counterfactual Policy” plots the correlation between firm productiv-
ity, Asi, and the share of firm i’s capital stock, Ksi, in sector s’s capital stock, Ks, for
different flat tax rate levels t¯. Panel (b) plots the correlation between firm productivity,
Asi, and the share of firm i’s labor, Lsi, in sector s’s labor, Ls, for different flat tax rate
levels t¯. The dotted line labeled “Data” corresponds to the correlation measures for the
observed Chilean data in 2003. The correlation of firm productivity with respect to both
capital and labor share drops as flat tax levels increase, which shows that the intrasectoral
reallocation mechanism described above drives the fall in the TFP gap. More resources are
being allocated toward less productive firms.
Figure 3: Correlation between Firm Productivity and Activity Share (2003)
(a) Capital (b) Labor
Notes: The solid blue line labeled “Counterfactual Policy” corresponds to the correlation between firm productivity and firm
activity share for different levels of t¯. The dotted orange line labeled “Data” corresponds to the correlation between firm
productivity and firm activity share in the data.
Next, we analyze the effect of these tax policies on government revenue. In Figure 4,
the blue schedule labeled “Counterfactual Policy” portrays the Laffer curve for different flat
tax rate policies. A clear trade-off stands out. Although very low flat tax rates yield higher
levels of TFP, government revenue from corporate taxation is smaller. The dotted line
labeled “Data” is the government revenue collected from the observed corporate tax rates.
The flat tax rate policy that yields the same revenue is t¯ = 7.97 percent. If this policy had
drops as the tax levels increase. 20
been implemented in Chile in 2003, then TFP would have increased by 0.77 percent. This
pattern, however, is not found for all years in our sample. For some years in our sample,
the revenue-neutral flat tax rate policy generates TFP gains with respect to the data, while
for others it generates TFP losses.
Figure 4: Relationship between Government Revenue and t¯ (2003)
Notes: The solid blue line labeled “Counterfactual Policy” corresponds to the government revenue for different levels of t¯. The
dotted orange line labeled “Data” corresponds to the government revenue implied by the observed effective tax rates.
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we analyze the sensitivity of the results in section 2.4 to our choice of
parameter values and our measure of labor input.
2.5.1 Sensitivity to Parameter Values
Table 5 shows the TFP gap from eliminating corporate taxes for different interest rates r,
depreciation rates δ, and values of σ, the parameter of the elasticity of substitution across
varieties. For different interest rates, results are identical to the benchmark. As seen in
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equation (4), when λ = 0, the interest rate r does not affect the accounting profits of firms.
Hence, it does not interact with the corporate tax rate in the marginal revenue products, as
shown in equations (5)-(8). For this reason, different interest rates do not affect the TFP
gap when corporate tax rates are eliminated. This is not the case anymore when we consider
different values of λ.
Table 5: TFP Gap for Different Parameter Values: tsi = 0 (percent)
Year Benchmark r = 0.01 r = 0.1 δ = 0.01 δ = 0.1 σ = 5
1998 5.47 5.47 5.47 4.26 5.92 11.04
1999 6.43 6.43 6.43 0.93 7.90 11.43
2000 8.22 8.22 8.22 5.37 9.48 15.74
2001 5.64 5.64 5.64 0.86 7.49 9.98
2002 4.52 4.52 4.52 1.46 5.62 8.00
2003 4.82 4.82 4.82 1.92 6.10 6.66
2004 4.16 4.16 4.16 0.92 6.15 7.42
2005 4.33 4.33 4.33 -4.08 7.48 6.52
2006 6.83 6.83 6.83 2.32 8.52 10.08
2007 11.12 11.12 11.12 7.75 12.56 16.73
On the other hand, the depreciation rate has a direct impact on accounting profits,
regardless of the value of λ. Moreover, as the depreciation rate increases, the TFP gains
from eliminating corporate taxes are higher. Finally, we have chosen a conservative σ at the
low end of the empirical estimates. Under σ = 5, the TFP gains are higher from moving from
the observed corporate tax rates to a counterfactual scenario with no corporate taxation.
As in section 2.4.3, we carry out the same flat tax rate policy counterfactuals. Our
results are robust when we consider different parameter values for r, δ, and σ. Figure 5
shows the same decreasing relationship between the TFP gap the level of the tax rate, t¯, as
the one found in Figure 1.
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Figure 5: Relationship between TFP gap and t¯: Parameter Sensitivity (2003)
2.5.2 Hours Worked as Input for Labor
In the results described above, we measure Lsi as the firm’s wage bill. As a robustness
check, we recalculate our estimates using hours worked as labor input.13 Similar to Hsieh
and Klenow (2009), using the wage bill for the labor input allows us to control for between-
firm heterogeneity in rent sharing, skill level, and hours worked requirements. As these
differences are not modeled in our framework, when we use hours as labor input, they are
loaded into the output and capital wedges. As a result, dispersion in TFPRsi is higher.
13The data set analyzed has hours worked only for the years 2001-2007.
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Figure 6: Relationship between TFP Gap and t¯: Hours as Labor Input (2003)
Repeating our exercise with hours as labor input yields two main findings. First, in line
with the results in section 2.4.3, the TFP gap falls when we increase the level of the corporate
tax rate, as seen in Figure 6. Second, the TFP gap across different counterfactual policies
is larger. This is because our results are amplified since the corporate tax rate interacts
with output and capital wedges, which are more dispersed for the reasons mentioned at the
beginning of this section. This result holds across all years of our sample, as seen in the
output gap decomposition in Table 16 in the appendix.
2.6 Robustness Checks on the Measurement of Effective Tax Rates
Given that we use average tax rates in our analysis, there is concern about the endogeneity
of firms’ characteristics and choices with our measure of the observed profit tax rate. To
address this concern, we conduct several robustness checks. First, we address the issue of
loss carryforward by firms, which could explain our results since we are considering a static
model. Second, we analyze what would happen if all capital was financed with debt, which
would change the financing structure of the firm and lower accounting profits, since interest24
can be subtracted. Third, we repeat our analysis with the permanent sample of firms. By
doing this, we discard the possibility that special tax incentives of young or old firms may
be driving our results. As shown below, we find that our results do not vary when taking
these issues into account.
2.6.1 Financing Capital with Debt
So far, we have assumed that capital is financed entirely with equity, λ = 0. This is a
strong assumption since firms may finance capital with a mix of capital and debt. Firms
have incentives to finance capital with debt since interest payments are discounted from
accounting profits and therefore lower the tax that firms must pay. In this section, we
analyze the other extreme case in which all capital is financed with debt λ = 1 to determine
whether our results are sensitive to this assumption. Note that our calculation of the effective
tax rate that firms face is not affected by the capital structure decision of the firm since
we observe profits net of interest and taxes. Hence, the tax rate we calculate already takes
into account the firm’s capital structure. However, our results will vary depending on the
amount of capital a firm finances with debt, since λ interacts with the effective tax rate tsi
in the marginal revenue product of capital.
Note that if we observed profits before subtracting interest and taxes instead of using
profits net of interest and taxes, differences in access to credit and other distortions that
may affect the capital structure would also be loaded into the effective tax rate instead of the
capital and output wedges. Also, it is important to note that the fraction of capital financed
with debt can potentially be firm specific. For example, some firms may have better access
to credit than others. Uras (2014) explores this mechanism and finds that it has important
implications for capital misallocation. In our setup, these differences in access to credit are
reflected in the capital and output wedges.
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Table 6: Output gap decomposition: λ = 1, tsi = 0 (percent)
Year Output Gap TFP Gap
Intersectoral
K
Intersectoral
L
∆Aggregate
Capital
1998 16.58 5.92 1.72 1.34 7.60
1999 17.51 7.90 1.31 1.00 7.30
2000 24.10 9.48 1.91 0.97 11.74
2001 18.75 7.49 0.85 0.71 9.70
2002 15.90 5.62 1.43 0.34 8.51
2003 16.79 6.10 1.13 0.52 9.03
2004 19.09 6.15 0.78 0.79 11.38
2005 26.57 7.48 0.16 1.68 17.26
2006 31.18 8.52 0.64 1.52 20.50
2007 34.54 12.56 0.58 1.29 20.11
Table 6 shows the output gap decomposition under λ = 1 and under the scenario in
which corporate tax rates are equal to tsi = 0. Results are very similar to those of Table
4. The increase in output from eliminating the effect of dispersion and level of corporate
taxes is mainly explained by an increase in aggregate capital demand and an increase in
TFP. Hence, we can see that intrasectoral reallocation of resources plays a significant role
in explaining the output gap, while intersectoral reallocation of resources has a negligible
effect on the output gap. This finding is consistent with the results found in section 2.4.2.
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Figure 7: Relationship between TFP Gap and t¯: λ = 1 (2003)
As in section 2.4.3, we carry out different counterfactual flat tax rate policies and evaluate
their relationship to the TFP gap. In Figure 7 we can observe the same pattern as in Figure
1. As the flat tax rate level increases, the TFP gap falls. Also under the assumption that
λ = 1, the dispersion of marginal products and revenue productivity increases as the flat tax
rate levels increase. Higher flat tax rates exacerbate the effect of output and capital wedges,
generating the increase in dispersion. Furthermore, as in section 2.4.3, this increase in the
dispersion of revenue productivity is a result of resources reallocating from more productive
firms to less productive firms as the flat tax rate increases.
2.6.2 Accounting for Loss Carryforward
One of the exemptions that generate dispersion in effective corporate tax rates is the fact
that plants can carry forward losses from one period to the next to reduce their tax base.
Firms optimally choose capital and labor taking into account that this exemption allows
them to reduce their tax burden. However, we do not model this explicitly since our analysis
is static, and thus this specific source of distortion is loaded into the wedges. To measure27
how sensitive our results are to this omission, we consider the following exercise. We take
the average across years for each plant’s relevant variables and estimate the TFP gap for our
policy counterfactuals. By doing this, any losses that could have been carried forward will
smooth out. Note that if all the dispersion in effective tax rates was due to this channel, the
tax rates that firms face in this exercise should be less dispersed and similar to the statutory
rate. This is not the case, however, as the effective tax rate calculated by averaging profit
and profit tax across years is distributed similarly to the effective tax rates calculated year
by year. We can see this by comparing Tables 1 and 7.
Table 7: Distribution of Effective Profit Tax Rates: Loss Carryforward (percent)
25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
Standard
Deviation
1.34 12.82 16.45 20.33 11.00
Our results for this exercise are similar to our benchmark results. The decomposition of
the output gap when firms face tsi = 0 can be seen in Table 17 in the appendix. When firms
do not face corporate tax rates, TFP increases by 6.18 percent, which is within the range
of values of our benchmark analysis, as seen in Table 4. Hence, loss carryforward is not
the main driver of the distortions generated by heterogeneous tax rates. Similar to section
2.4.2, intersectoral reallocation of resources accounts for a very small portion of the output
gap, while changes in aggregate capital demand play a more significant role.
As in the benchmark, we also carry out flat tax rate counterfactual policies and measure
their effect on aggregate TFP. We find that the negative relationship between the TFP gap
and the flat tax rate level still persists, as seen in Figure 8. Hence, despite eliminating
the dispersion in corporate tax rates coming from loss carryforward, as the flat tax rate
increases, resources are allocated from more efficient firms to less efficient firms.
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Figure 8: Relationship between TFP Gap and t¯: Loss Carryforward (2003)
2.6.3 Permanent Sample
Dispersion in corporate tax rates can potentially be driven by tax exemptions given to young
entrant firms, which are usually directed at fostering industry competition. If this is the only
source of tax rate dispersion and entrant firms are relatively less productive than incumbent
firms, then these tax exemptions would be responsible for the positive TFP gap shown
in Table 4. Intuitively, these tax exemptions would be allocating more resources to less
productive entrant firms and fewer resources to more productive incumbent ones. Hence, if
Chile moved to a tax policy with no corporate taxes, then resources would reallocate to the
more productive incumbent firms, generating the positive TFP gap.
To control for this mechanism, we focus on the firms that were always in operation for
the period 1998 to 2007 and then perform the output gap decomposition for the years 2003
to 2007. By doing this, we make sure that the firms had been in operation at least five
years.14 If the only source of tax rate dispersion was exemptions to less productive entrant
14We also perform the analysis for the years 1998 to 2002, and the results are very similar.
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firms, then when we eliminate them from the sample, the TFP gap would be 0. This is
not the case, however, as can be seen in Table 8, which implies that there are other sources
of corporate tax rate dispersion that generate a positive TFP gap. In this exercise, we
also control for the fact that less productive exiting firms are driving our results, since the
permanent sample comprises highly productive firms that have been operating for at least
10 years.
As shown in Table 18 in the appendix, there is significant dispersion in the effective
corporate tax rates faced by the firms in the permanent sample for all years. Hence, tax
exemptions given to young firms are not the main driver of this dispersion.
Table 8: Output Gap Decomposition: Permanent Sample, tsi = 0 (percent)
Year Output Gap TFP Gap
Intersectoral
K
Intersectoral
L
∆Aggregate
Capital
2003 19.23 2.63 -0.08 0.75 15.98
2004 22.40 4.32 0.16 1.29 16.99
2005 22.96 3.54 -0.09 1.36 18.13
2006 27.75 4.74 -0.91 2.18 21.72
2007 26.36 5.36 -0.20 1.68 19.51
By comparing Table 8 with Table 4, we can see that the results for intersectoral reallo-
cation of resources and changes in input demands are similar. Also, we can observe that the
TFP gap from eliminating corporate taxes is smaller in the permanent sample in compar-
ison to the whole sample. The main reason for this finding is that the permanent sample
controls for firm entry and exit. Firms in this sample had been in operation for at least 10
years in 2007. Hence, they were relatively more productive than the firms that entered or
exited the sample during the time period we analyze. We document this finding in Figure
9, in which we compare the distribution of log (Asi) for the whole sample in comparison to
the permanent sample for 2003.
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Figure 9: Distribution of log (Asi) for the Whole and Permanent Samples
We find that the mean of log (Asi) is higher in the permanent sample in comparison to
the whole sample. Moreover, the distribution of the permanent sample has a much thinner
left tail and is more concentrated around the mean. This pattern occurs in all the years
between 1998 and 2007. This is evidence that the firms that exit every year tend to be the
least productive firms, while the more productive firms remain. As a result, the gains from
reallocation of resources in the permanent sample are smaller than in the whole sample.15
Last, it is important to note that for the permanent sample, the TFP gap is also decreasing
in the level of flat tax rates, as seen in Figure 19 in the appendix.
2.7 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter is to quantify the effects of corporate tax rates on aggregate
TFP through allocative efficiency. To do this, we set up a standard monopolistic competition
model that includes firm-specific corporate tax rates as well as output and capital wedges.
15This finding is consistent with what Gopinath et al. (2017) find when analyzing Spanish firm-level data.31
In our framework, firms can choose whether to face a positive tax rate and have non-negative
accounting profits or face a tax rate of 0 percent and have non-positive accounting profits.
We incorporate this exemption from the Chilean tax code to address the caveat that firms’
behavior can affect the effective tax rate they face. We calibrate the model and find that
if Chile had eliminated corporate tax rates, then TFP would have increased between 4
percent and 11 percent for the period 1998-2007. We also analyze how different levels of flat
corporate tax rates affect TFP in an economy characterized by other distortions. We show
that there is a monotonically decreasing relationship between the TFP gap and the level of
the flat tax rate. We carry out a sensitivity analysis on parameters and robustness checks
on our measure of effective tax rates and find that our results do not vary.
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3 Misallocation in Economies with Financial Frictions
and Firing Costs
3.1 Introduction
Emerging economies are characterized as having underdeveloped financial markets. More-
over, many of these economies have employment protection laws that make it costly for
firms to fire workers. These features hamper the allocation of resources across firms which
in turn affects the total factor productivity (TFP) of an economy. Therefore, it is important
to consider the full extent of their impact when evaluating financial or labor policy reforms.
To accomplish this, it is key to understand the interaction between the level of financial
development and labor protection legislation in a given economy.
This chapter quantifies the effect of a financial reform on TFP in an economy with
firing costs. To do this, I develop a quantitative model of heterogeneous firms owned by
entrepreneurs that face collateral constraints and have to pay firing costs. I then calibrate
the economy using detailed census plant level data from the manufacturing sector in Chile,
a country where firing costs are relatively high and a financial market that was not fully
developed during 1995 to 2007, the period analyzed. Next, I carry out a counterfactual
policy experiment where collateral constraints are relaxed to achieve the level of financial
development of the United Kingdom.16 I find that after the reform TFP increases by 2.5%.
Importantly, if firing costs are excluded from the analysis, the increase in TFP after the
reform is only 0.3%. Finally, I study the effect on productivity of the interaction between
these two frictions when evaluating labor and financial reforms. I do this for a range of
economies with plausible initial levels of financial development and firing costs.
This study brings together two strands of literature - that on financial friction as a
source of low TFP in developing economies and that on the effects of firing costs on allocative
efficiency and TFP - by studying the interaction of these sources of frictions on productivity.
In general, the literature that studies financial frictions assume frictionless labor markets and
do not incorporate the effect of labor policy into their analysis.17 Similarly, the literature
16Following the literature that studies the effect of financial frictions on TFP, I use external credit-to-
output as a measure of financial development. The average credit to output ratio in the Chilean manufac-
turing sector during the period analyzed is 0.33. The same measure for the United Kingdom is 1.10.
17Examples of this literature are Buera et al. (2011), and Gopinath et al. (2017). Buera and Shin (2013)
analyze the effects of financial frictions and incorporate a reduce form friction that affects labor choices of
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studying the effects of firing costs on misallocation and productivity frequently abstracts
from incorporating capital decisions into their analysis, or assumes capital markets with no
frictions.18 I incorporate both of these frictions into my analysis and find that studying
them jointly is important to quantify the effect of both financial and labor market policies.
To study the effect of a financial reform in an economy with firing costs, I develop
a general equilibrium small open economy model where entrepreneurs own firms that are
heterogeneous in their productivity shock. Entrepreneurs have consumption and saving
decisions, rent capital from international lenders and hire labor to produce. Capital is
subject to a collateral constraint, hence entrepreneurs can rent it up to a multiple of their
net worth. Moreover, they must pay firing costs proportional to wages when adjusting their
level of labor downwards. As a result, firms are endogenously heterogeneous in their net
worth and the level of past employment. To close the model, homogeneous workers supply
labor inelastically and receive firing costs back as a transfer from the government. The
calibrated model is able to reproduce cross sectional moments in the micro data as well as
aggregate moments related to the two frictions analyzed.
In the model collateral constraints and firing costs interact as follows. Consider first
an economy with only firing costs. In such economy, the allocation of labor is distorted.
Firms with high past employment who receive bad productivity shocks do not fire workers
since it is costly to do so. Firms with low past employment who receive good shocks do not
hire as many workers, since they expect that their productivity might be low in the future
and do not want to be stuck with a high level of past employment. In this economy, firms’
net worth is irrelevant for their decisions since it is not used as collateral. Alternatively,
consider an economy where only collateral constraints are present. Given a level of net
worth, in this economy firms who receive good productivity shocks are more likely to be
financially constrained than firms who receive bad shocks. Past employment is irrelevant for
firms’ decisions in this setting since there are no firing costs. Finally, consider an economy
where both collateral constraints and firing costs are present. In this case, both the level
of net worth and of past employment will have an impact on firms decisions. Given a level
of net worth there can be four types of firms. Two types of firms were also present in the
firms. However, they do not study the effects of specific labor policies in their analysis.
18 Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Veracierto (2001), Petrin and Sivadasan (2011), Da-Rocha et al.
(2016)
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previous economy with only financial frictions. These are firms with low past employment
who receive bad shocks, and firms with high level of past employment who receive good
shocks. The former will demand little labor and capital and as a result, are not likely to
be financially constrained. The latter will demand a large amount of capital and labor,
and therefore are likely to be financially constrained. However, there are two types of firms
that only arise in this economy. Firms with high past employment who receive bad shocks
will not fire workers, and since labor and capital are complements, will demand a large
amount of capital. Hence, there will be some firms with bad shocks who will be financially
constrained because they have hoarded too much labor and therefore demand more capital
than in the economy with just financial frictions. Furthermore, there will be firms with low
levels of past employment who receive good shocks that hire less workers than they would
in the absence of firing costs. As a result, they will demand less capital and hence will be
less likely to be financially constrained. This interaction is the driver of the quantitative
results of the policy evaluations.
To carry out the quantitative analysis I calibrate the model using the data set described
in Chapter 1. The richness of the data makes it possible to estimate firms’ production
functions using Wooldridge (2009) method, a refinement to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
and Olley and Pakes (1996). Thus, productivity and technology parameters are estimated
directly from the micro data. In the period I analyze is 1995-2007. During this period,
there were no labor reforms and the financial market remained relatively stable.19 This is
important since in the calibration I will assume that the economy is in a steady state.
Using the model described above calibrated to the Chilean economy, I study the effect
of a financial reform that increases Chile’s external credit-to-output ratio to the level of
the United Kingdom. I find that, in the long run, the reform generates an increases in
TFP of 2.5%. This is driven by a sharp improvement in the allocation of capital, which is
achieved through a direct and an indirect channel. Directly, through the relaxation of the
collateral constraint, which implies that firms require less net worth to become financially
unconstrained. Indirectly, since the reform induces an increase in wages which leads to an
increase in the effective cost of firing and hence firms with low past employment who receive
19Between 1991 and 1998 there was a 30% unremunerated reserve requirement imposed in Chile for all
new credit. Empirical evidence suggests that it had small effects on the real exchange rate. See Andreasen
et al. (2018)
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high productivity shocks hire less labor and demand less capital.20 The increase in wages
also worsens the allocation of labor, as measured by an increase in the dispersion of the
marginal product of this input. However, this effect is not strong enough to offset the gains
from a better allocation of capital.
To study the importance of incorporating firing costs into the analysis, I recalibrate the
model to Chile ignoring firing costs and perform the same policy counterfactual. In this
economy, TFP increases by only 0.3% after the reform. The difference stems from the type
of firms that are constrained and the fact that the indirect effect is not present in this
economy.
To further explore how these two frictions interact, I analyze different economies within a
plausible range of levels of both collateral constraints and firing costs. I perform two different
policy counterfactuals. First, I explore the effects of relaxing the collateral constraint for
economies with different levels of firing costs. Second, I study how economies with different
levels of financial development are affected by an increase in firing costs.
Regarding the first counterfactual, I find that there is a non-monotonic relationship
between the increase on TFP following a financial reform and the level of the firing cost in
the economy. There are two reasons for this. First, in economies with low firing costs, wages
are more elastic to a relaxation of the collateral constraints and as a result, the effective
cost of firing a worker increases more than in economies with higher firing costs. Thus, the
distortion of the allocation of labor offsets some of the gains from the improvement in the
allocation of capital. Furthermore, if the firing cost is too high, there is little reallocation of
labor and hence little reallocation of capital. Second, the type of firms that are constrained
prior to the reform is different for different levels of firing costs. In economies with low firing
costs, firms do no hoard labor since it is relatively cheap to adjust it. In economies where
the firing cost is too high, firms are discouraged from growing and thus will not have large
levels of past employment. In these two types of economies, the firms that are financially
constrained will be mostly firms who receive high productivity shocks. As a result, the
impact on TFP of relaxing the collateral constraint will be lower relative to economies with
moderate levels of firing costs. In such economies, firms who hoard labor ,and hence demand
more capital, will be financially constrained even after receiving bad productivity shocks.
20Since firing costs are proportional to wages, an increase in the wage increases the effective cost of firing.
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When studying how labor policy affects s economies with different levels of financial
development, I find that economies with more developed financial markets suffer a smaller
drop on TFP after an increase in firing costs. There are two effects driving this result.
First, in economies where the level of financial development is higher, firms use less internal
resources to rent capital, relative to economies with tighter collateral constraints. As a result,
firms can use some of their profits to pay for the firing cost and have a better allocation of
labor. Second, given an increase in firing costs, the allocation of capital is worsened, driven
by firms who hoard too much labor and thus demand too much capital. This negative effect
is ameliorated in economies where financial constraints are loose.
Increasing firing costs has direct implications for the capital-labor ratio of the economy.
Interestingly, the model replicates the findings of the empirical literature that studies the
effect of firing costs on firm investment. This literature finds that the relationship between
the capital-labor ratio and firing costs is hump-shaped. In my analysis, there is a slight
increase in capital-labor ratio following an increase in firing costs in economies with a low
level of firing costs. This is consistent with the findings of Autor et al. (2007) who study the
implications on firm investment of the adoption of wrongfully discharged protection by state
courts in the United States. Moreover, in economies with relatively high levels of financial
development and firing costs, and increase in firing costs generates a decrease in the capital-
labor ratio. This is in line with the findings of Calcagnini et al. (2009) and Cingano et al.
(2014) who find a negative relation between firing costs and capital-labor ratio in European
economies.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section two describes the chapter’s
relation and contribution to the literature. In section three I develop the model that will
be used through out the analysis. Section four describes the data, calibration and the fit of
the model. I present the results of the financial reform in section five. Section six analyzes
the implications of financial and labor policy reforms in economies with a plausible range
of both firing costs and collateral constraints. I conclude in section seven.
3.2 Literature Review
This chapter contributes mainly to two strands of literature by bringing them together, that
one that studies financial frictions as a source of low TFP in developing countries, and that
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studying the effect of firing costs on the allocation of resources and productivity.
Regarding the first one, Midrigan and Xu (2014) find that financial frictions have little
impact on productivity through capital misallocation. They study an environment with
frictionless labor markets and find that most of the effect of the financial frictions on TFP
comes from distorting the decisions of firms to upgrade technology. Similarly, Buera et al.
(2011) also find that the most important channel is the extensive one, in an environment with
no labor frictions. I focus on the impact of financial frictions on the allocation of resources
and incorporate a relevant labor market policy that affects the way these resources are
allocated.
With respect to the second strand of literature, an early example is Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993). This study abstracts from capital allocation and studies the effect of
firing costs on firms decisions to operate and how labor is allocated across them. They find
that firing costs reduce productivity, mainly from the extensive margin. Veracierto (2001)
builds on the previous study and incorporates capital choice into the analysis. He finds that
incorporating capital is not important for understanding the long run and welfare effects
of firing taxes, but it does impact the short run implications of eliminating firing costs.
Importantly, he assumes that the capital market is frictionless. I add collateral constraints
into the analysis and find that the level of financial development is important to understand
the long term consequences of imposing firing costs. Petrin and Sivadasan (2011) study
the impact of firing costs in Chile after a labor reform in 1991 that increased the ceiling
of severance payments from five monthly wages to eleven. They find that the allocation of
labor worsened after the reform. Da-Rocha et al. (2016) study an environment where firing
costs not only distort the allocation of resources but also affect the underlying distribution
of firms’ productivity. They find that this channel is important in explaining the impact of
firing costs on aggregate productivity. There is no capital decision in the model. Overall
the literature on financial frictions and development has ignored labor market policies and
the literature on firing costs abstracts from distorted capital markets. To the best of my
knowledge this is the first study to analyze these two frictions together and quantify the
effect of their interaction on the allocation of resources and TFP.
This chapter also contributes to the empirical literature studying the impact of the
interaction between the level of financial development and firing costs in firm investment
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and productivity. Calcagnini et al. (2009) use firm level data from ten European countries
and perform an estimation of a dynamic panel model. They find that financial frictions
are positively correlated with firms’ cash holdings and these are larger in countries with
more strict employment protection legislation. Another study by Calcagnini et al. (2014)
finds that investment is affected by the presence of both frictions and that the effect of
labor market regulation is weaker in countries with more developed financial markets. I find
qualitatively similar results. Cingano et al. (2014) estimate the impact of firing costs on
capital deepening and productivity. They analyze a specific reform in Italy where firms with
less than fifteen employees ceased to be exempt from paying firing costs. They find that
firing costs induced an increase in th capital to labor ratio and a decline in TFP. Moreover,
the firms most affected by the reform were firms with low levels of liquidity, their proxy for
financial frictions. I contribute to this literature by developing and calibrating a structural
model that allows to study counterfactual policies in the presence of both financial frictions
and firing costs.
Finally, this study is also related to a large literature that studies the impact of financial
frictions on labor outcomes. Buera et al. (2015) study how a credit crunch following the 2007-
2008 financial crisis in the U.S. affected output, unemployment and net employment growth.
Arellano et al. (2016) analyze how a tightening in financial conditions affected output and
labor during the recession of 2007-2009. I contribute to this literature by analyzing the
interaction of financial frictions with a specific labor market distortion, namely firing costs.
3.3 Model
This section provides a description of the theoretical model used for the analysis of a fi-
nancial reform. The two key ingredients are collateral constraints faced by firms and labor
adjustment costs that firms have to pay.
3.3.1 Setting
I consider a small open economy populated by two types of agents: entrepreneurs and
workers. Time is discrete and infinite, and there is only one type of good in the economy.
Capital is rented by entrepreneurs from international financial intermediaries.
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3.3.2 Agents
Entrepreneurs There is a measure one of infinitely lived entrepreneurs. Every period,
each entrepreneur receives an idiosyncratic productivity shock zt which evolves according
to an AR(1) process. They are heterogeneous in their productivity shock zt, level of net
worth at, and past employment `t−1. Each entrepreneur can only own one firm. They have
preferences over consumption given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct) , u (c) =
c1−σ
1− σ . (21)
The firm owned by the entrepreneur uses capital kt and current employment `t to produce
yt = zt
(
kαt `
1−α
t
)ν
,
where zt is the productivity shock, α ∈ (0, 1) is the output elasticity of capital, and ν is the
span of control parameter that controls the decreasing returns to scale.
Workers There is a unit measure of homogeneous hand-to-mouth workers. Workers pref-
erences are
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (Cωt ) ,
where Cωt is the aggregate consumption of all workers and u (c) is the same as defined above.
International lenders International lenders rent capital and receive deposits from en-
trepreneurs. The return on deposits is rt. Lenders are competitive and the zero-profit
condition implies that the rental cost of capital Rt = rt + δ. Capital is rented intraperiod,
and the amount an entrepreneur can rent is subject to a collateral constraint. In particular,
entrepreneurs can rent up to a multiple λ of their net worth, kt ≤ λat. This captures the
level of financial development in the economy.21 All entrepreneurs are subject to the same
collateral constraint.
21This type of constraint has been extensively used in the financial development literature. See for example
Buera and Shin (2013) and Moll (2014).
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3.3.3 Problem of the Entrepreneur
Entrepreneurs make consumption/savings decisions, hire labor in a competitive market at a
wage wt and rent capital from international lenders. There is a firing cost that is proportional
to wages, wtg (`t−1, `t) = τ max {0, `t−1 − `t}.22 The entrepreneur’s budget constraint is
ct + at+1 = yit − wt`t −Rtkt − wg (`t−1, `t) + (1 + r) at. (22)
The problem of the entrepreneur can be written recursively. Let the individual state of
a particular entrepreneur be her net worth a, past employment `, and productivity shock z.
The recursive problem is to maximize the value value function:
V (a, `, z) = max
{c,k,`,a′}
u (c) + βEz′|zV (a′, `, z′) (23)
subject to
c+ a′ = z
(
kα`1−α
)ν − w`− (r + δ) k − wg (`, `) + (1 + r) a
k ≤ λa.
3.3.4 Problem of the Worker
Workers supply labor inelastically and receive transfers from the government. These trans-
fers are the sum of the firing costs paid by firms. Hence, given a wage w and transfers T ,
total consumption of workers is given by
Cω = w + T
3.3.5 Equilibrium
Given r, a stationary equilibrium is a wage w, an endogenous distribution of entrepreneur
types µ, entrepreneurs’ choices c (a, `, z, µ), k (a, `, z, µ), `′ (a, `, z, µ), a′ (a, `, z, µ), and work-
ers’ consumption Cω, such that:
1. Given w and r, the policy functions for the firm, c (a, `, z, µ), a′ (a, `, z, µ), ` (a, `, z, µ),
and k (a, `, z, µ), solve the entrepreneur’s problem (23).
22See Section 3.4 for details on the functional form choice.41
2. The labor market clears:
1 =
∫
` (a, `, z, µ) dµ (a, `, z, µ)
3. The good market clears:
Cω +
∫
c (a, `, z, µ) dµ (a, `, z, µ) =
∫
z
(
k (a, `, z, µ)α ` (a, `, z, µ)1−α
)ν
dµ (a, `, z, µ)
− δ
∫
k (a, `, z, µ) dµ (a, `, z, µ)
+ r
∫
[k (a, `, z, µ)− a] dµ (a, `, z, µ)
3.3.6 Interaction Between Firing Costs and the Collateral Constraint
To understand why the firing cost and the collateral constraint interact, it is convenient
to look at the policy function of labor with respect to past employment, given net worth
a and current productivity shock z. This is shown in Figure 10. The solid line is the
policy function when τ > 0, the dotted line represents the policy function when τ = 0, and
the dashed line is the 45 degree line. The key aspect of the policy function when τ > 0
is that there is an inaction zone in which the firm does not adjust labor. Moreover, the
firm only hires if the level of past employment is very low (in this case, below 5) and only
fires if past employment is too high (in this example, above 15). Note that if firing costs
are 0, the labor choice does not depend on past employment. Hence, firms with high past
employment who receive bad shocks may end up with more labor relative to the case when
τ = 0. Alternatively, firms who receive good shocks and have low past employment may
hire less labor than they would in an economy with no firing costs. Since capital and labor
are complements, these distortions in labor will translate into firms demanding too much or
too little capital relative to the case when τ = 0. On one hand, there will be firms with high
past employment who receive bad shocks that will demand a large amount of capital, and
will be more likely to be financially constrained relative to an economy with no firing costs.
On the other hand, there will be firms with a low level of past employment who receive
good shocks and demand less capital than in the economy with τ = 0. These firms will be
less likely to be financially constrained.
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Figure 10: Labor Policy Function for a given a and z
3.4 Parametrization
In this section, I describe how I parameterize the model described above to match key
features of the Chilean economy and its manufacturing sector. I choose parameters on
preferences, technology and the stochastic process of firm specific productivity. One period
is set to be a year.
I need to determine nine parameter values: two technological parameters, α and ν; two
parameters governing the productivity process that firms face, ρ and σ; the coefficient of
risk aversion, γ; and the discount factor β; the firing cost τ and the collateral constraint
parameter λ.
3.4.1 Data
The main data set used is the ENIA (Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual), the data set
described in Chapter 1. I use data for the period 1995-2007, as there were no reforms in the
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labor market during this time frame, and financial conditions were stable. This is important
since I will assume the economy is in a steady state when calibrating the model. Moreover,
after 2007 the data set has no way of linking firms across time. For the estimation of the
productivity process and the span of control parameter I use the permanent sample of firms.
To construct the sample used in this analysis, I drop observations with negative values
for book value of capital, gross revenue, intermediate materials, wage bill, services, and
electricity. To control for outliers, I trim the top and bottom 1% of these variables. The
data set comes with four-digit industry deflators for gross revenue and intermediate inputs
that I use to deflate the relevant variables.
3.4.2 Firing Costs
To study the role of firing costs in this economy, I set g (`, `) = τ max {0, `− `}. This
functional form has been used extensively in the literature.23 Moreover, this specification
is a reduced form of capturing the way firing costs work in Chile. In Chile, a worker who
is fired for economic reasons has to be given a one month notice or be paid one monthly
wage to be dismissed immediately. Moreover, she has to be paid one monthly wage per
year worked at the firm, up to 11 months. There are also judicial fees and other costs. To
calculate the flow cost of firing a worker in Chile, I use the estimate from Heckman and
Pagés (2003). In this study, the authors measure the direct cost as a fraction of monthly
wages, of job security provision. These costs include the costs of dismissing a worker for
economic reasons. This includes administrative procedures, advanced notification, severance
payments, and the legal costs of a trial if workers contest dismissals. They then calculate
the present discounted cost of firing a worker. To do this, they assume a discount rate
and dismissal rate of 8 and 12 percent respectively. The discount rate is motivated by the
historical return of an internationally diversified portfolio. The turnover rate is that of the
United States. Finally, they assume that the maximum tenure that a worker can attain in
a firm is twenty years. According to their assumptions, the expected discounted value of
firing a worker in Chile is 3.4 monthly wages. Using their assumptions, I then back out the
flow cost of firing a worker in Chile. I find this to be 5.6 monthly wages.24 Since a period
23See Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Veracierto (2001), Da-Rocha et al. (2016)
24I do robustness on the maximum amount of tenure a worker can get, and set it to be a very large
number. The flow cost is then 5.74 monthly wages .
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in my model is a year, I then set τ = 0.47 to match the flow cost of dismissal.
Most of this cost is comprised by severance payments. Lazear (1990) points out that, in
absence of any other friction, a contract can be written specifying a side payment from the
worker to the firm that fully offsets the firing cost. Petrin and Sivadasan (2011) study the
effect of a change in the dismissal cost in Chile in 1990, and find no clear evidence that the
changes on job security were offset through lower wage rates. Moreover, in a setting where
firms are subject to financial constraints, the timing of dismissal matters since this would
reduce the resources available for the firm to increase their net worth.
3.4.3 Productivity Process and Span of Control Parameter
To estimate the firm productivity and span of control parameters I use Wooldridge (2009)
extension of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology to estimate firms’ production func-
tion. Using the panel data described in Section 3.4.1, I estimate the following gross output
production function:
yist = βskkist + βs` `ist + βsvvist + βseeist + βsmmist + εist (24)
where yist is the log of gross output, kist is the log of book value of capital, `ist is the log of
wage bill, vist is the value of services, eist is the log of the quantity of electricity used, and
mist is the log of materials used by firm i in industry s at time t. Gross output is deflated
using a four-digit industry deflator for gross output. Services, materials and wage bill are
deflated by a four-digit industry intermediate input deflator. Capital is deflated using an
investment deflator.25 The estimation is done separately for each 2-digit industry.
The error is assumed to be
εist = Ωist + ηist
where Ωist is the transmitted component of the firm specific productivity shock, and ηist is
the i.i.d. firm specific productivity shock. The idea of the method used is to express the
transmitted component as a function of the state variables and a proxy variable. Following
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) , I use materials as a proxy variable.26 Moreover, since there
25I follow Gopinath et al. (2017), Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and others in measuring capital by its book
value.
26Olley and Pakes (1996) use investment as a proxy variable. Due to lumpiness in investment, there are
missing variables for a number of observations. I use materials since all the firms in my data have positive
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are adjustment costs to labor in the model analyzed, I include labor as a state variable, in
addition to capital. Hence, given some function h (., .), I assume the transmitted component
to be:
Ωist = h (xist,mist)
where xist = (`ist, kist) is the vector of state variables.
Three more assumptions are needed to identify the parameters of the production func-
tion:
1. The state variables are uncorrelated with the innovation:
bist ≡ Ωist − E (Ωist | Ωist−1)
2. Lagged states and proxy variables are uncorrelated with the innovation:
E (xist,xist−1, φist−1,mist−1, ...,xis1, φis1,mis1) = E (Ωist | Ωist−1)
≡ F [h (xist−1,mist−1)]
where φist = (eist−1, vist−1) is the vector of variable inputs.
3. An orthogonality condition
E (bist + εist | xist,xist−1, φist−1,mist−1, ...,xis1, φis1,mis1) = 0.
Finally, the function used in the estimation is
yist = βskkist + βs` `ist + βsvvist + βseeist + βsmmist + F [h (xist−1,mist−1)] + bist + εist
I approximate F [h (xist−1,mist−1)] using general second order polynomial, and use first
and second lags of electricity and services, and second lags of wage bill as instruments.
I use the estimated elasticities, and the residuals of the estimation to calculate both the
span of control parameter used and to estimate the productivity process.
non missing observations for this variable.
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Span of control parameter The returns to scale are in the range of 0.75 and 1.03
depending on the industry.27 These values are in line with other estimates from micro-
data.28 The median of these estimates (0.85) is used as the span of control parameter
ν.
Productivity process The idiosyncratic productivity process is an AR(1) in logs:
zt = − σ
2
2 (1 + ρ) + ρzt−1 + σu
z
t , with uzt ∼ N (0, 1) (25)
where ρ is the persistence of the productivity process and σ is the standard deviation of
the idiosyncratic productivity shock uzt . The constant term normalizes the mean of the
idiosyncratic productivity to 1.
To back out these parameters, I used the fitted values of the production function esti-
mation to back out εˆist.29
I then run the following regression:
εˆist = ηi + ηst + ρˆεˆist−1 + ist,
where ηi and ηst are a firm fixed effect and an industry-year fixed effect respectively. I
then set σ = 0.48 to match the average of the cross sectional variance of ist.30 Including
fixed effects generates a downward bias in the estimate of ρˆ due to the short time series.
To overcome this caveat, I set ρ = 0.42 so that in the model generated data of 13 sample
periods, the estimate persistence parameter equals 0.272, which is the value of ρˆ in the
data. Note that in the data, the standard deviation of log (εˆist) is equal to 0.67. The model
implied standard deviation for log(z) is 0.61.31
27Table 19 in the Appendix summarizes other moments of the span of control parameters found in the
data.
28Petrin and Sivadasan (2011) use a an earlier version of the ENIA and find 3-digit industry estimates to
be between 0.82 and 1.06. Gopinath et al. (2017) do this for a set of European countries and find similar
values
29To control for outliers, I drop the top and bottom 1% of fitted values εˆist per year
30To calculate this measure, I drop the top and bottom 1% of the error terms per year.
31To maximize the length of the sample used, I estimate of the productivity process using firms that were
active for all periods in the sample.
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Table 9: Parameters
Parameter Description Value Source
Internally Calibrated:
λ Collateral Constrain 1.35
Superintendencia de
Bancos de Chile
Externally Calibrated
ν Span of Control 0.85 ENIA 1995-2007
ρ
Auto-correlation
productivity process
0.42 ENIA 1995-2007
σ
Variance of innovation
AR(1)
0.48 ENIA 1995-2007
Other Parameters
r Real interest rate 6.45% Banco Central Chile
γ CRRA parameter 2.0
δ Depreciation 0.06
β Discount factor 0.92
α Capital elasticity 0.36 ENIA 1995-2007
Note: The collateral constraint parameter is set to match the external credit-to-output ratio of Chile in the manufacturing
sector equal to 0.33. The externally calibrated parameters are obtained from estimating firms’ production function using
Wooldridge (2009) method. The interest rate is the average across years of the difference between the nominal interest rate on
commercial loans and next year’s expected inflation. The capital elasticity is set to match the labor share calculated from the
ENIA for the period analyzed. Parameters without source are conventional parameters from the financial frictions literature.
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3.4.4 Other Parameters
Collateral Constraint I calibrate λ by requiring that the model matches the external
finance-to-value added ratio for the manufacturing sector of the Chilean economy which is
equal to 0.33. This value is taken from the Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Fi-
nancieras de Chile, who measures the total credit balances for the manufacturing industries
included in the data base.
Real Interest Rate I measure the real exchange rate, r, as the average across years of the
difference between the nominal interest rate on commercial loans and next year’s expected
inflation. This information is taken from the Banco Central de Chile.
Conventional parameters The reminder of the parameters are chosen from conventional
values in the literature. I set γ = 2, α = 0.33, the 1-year depreciation rate is set at δ = 0.06,
and the discount factor is set to be β = 0.92.
3.4.5 Model Fit
This section summarizes the fit of the model. To do this I compare the cross-sectional
implications of the model against the micro data. Table 10 summarizes these findings.
The model does a good job capturing the dispersion of labor in the economy. Since I
do not incorporate adjustment costs of capital or time-to-build into the model, capital is
more volatile in the model than in the data, since these features are likely to hamper capital
dispersion. This also explains why output is more volatile in the data than in the model.
As an external check on the calibration of the firing cost, I calculate the mean across
years of the share of firms that pay severance payments (and hence firing costs) in the data
and compare it to the model.32 In the data, this share is 0.22, while in the model is 0.30.
32I do this for the years 1995 to 2001, since those are the years in which I have data on severance payments.
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Table 10: Cross-sectional Moments, Model and Data
Moment Data Model
S.D (log z) 0.67 0.61
S.D. (log `) 1.05 2.41
S.D. (log k) 1.60 2.43
S.D. (log y) 1.08 2.48
Top 30% Share Agg. Labor 0.70 0.90
Top 30% Share Agg. Capital 0.80 0.92
Note: standard deviations of variables in the data are the average standard deviation
across the years 1996 to 2007.
3.5 Financial Reform in Chile
In this section I evaluate the effects of a financial reform in Chile. To do this, I use the
baseline calibration and explore the effects of increasing the external credit-to-output ratio
of Chile from 0.33 to 1.10, a level similar to that of the United Kingdom during the period
analyzed.33
To study the effects of the reform on productivity, I will first define a measure of total
factor productivity and marginal products of capital and labor.
Let total factor productivity be defined as
TFP := Y
KαL1−α
(26)
which is consistent with other studies in the literature.34
33The UK is a good example since it had a per period cost of firing a worker of 2.5 monthly wages during
the period analyzed and its credit-to-output ratio was high. See Heckman and Pagés (2003))
34See Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), and Buera and Shin (2013) for an economy where firms have
decreasing returns to scale and TFP is defined as in 26. As a robustness check, I redefine TFP to be
TFP := Y(KαL1−α)ν as in Midrigan and Xu (2014) and get similar results.50
The marginal product of capital and labor for a given firm i with idiosyncratic state
(a, `, z) are
MRPL := ν (1− α) yi
`i
= w (1 + τ`i) (27)
MRPK := ναyi
ki
= (r + δ) (1 + τki) (28)
where τ`i and τki denote the percent deviation of the marginal products from w and (r + δ)
respectively.
In an economy with no financial frictions and no firing costs τ`i = τki = 0 ∀i. Most
studies that analyze the impact of financial frictions assume a frictionless labor market,
which in the present model implies τ`i = 0 ∀i. In the presence of firing costs, this is not the
case anymore. Depending on the idiosyncratic state, firms can have MRPL below or above
w. Hence, changes in the dispersion of MRPL are informative of how labor reallocates after
a reform. Similarly, in the presence of financial frictions, financially constrained firms will
have MRPK higher than (r + δ). Importantly, the level of firing costs will also interact with
the dispersion in MRPK.
3.5.1 An Economy with Firing Costs
I first analyze the effects of the financial reform in the baseline economy where firing costs
are present. Table 11 summarizes the long run effects of the financial reform. Following
the reform, TFP increases by 2.5%. This increase is driven by a substantial decrease in
the dispersion of the marginal product of capital. This is expected since now the collateral
constrained is relaxed and hence firms will be less likely to be financially constrained. There
is also an indirect effect that arises when firing costs are present in the economy.
Since firms are less financially constrained, there is an increase in the demand for capital.
Since capital and labor are complements, firms also demand more labor. As a result, the
wage goes up. This increases the effective cost of firing a worker (recall firing costs are
proportional to the wage). Hence, firms who receive good productivity shocks and have low
past employment will hire less labor relative to prior the reform, which will in turn make
these firms less likely to be financially constrained. This improves the allocation of capital.
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Table 11: Aggregate Changes after Financial Reform, τ = 0.5
Moment Value
%∆TFP 2.5
%∆S.D.MRPK -81.0
%∆S.D.MRPL
4.0
The wage increase has a negative effect on the allocation of labor since the effective cost
of firing a worker has increased. This generates an increase in the dispersion of the marginal
product of labor. However, this effect is not quantitatively large as to offset the effect on
TFP of the better allocation of capital.
3.5.2 Ignoring Firing Costs
In this section I analyze the effects of the reform if firing costs are ignored from the analysis,
and compare the results to the economy with firing costs. To carry out this analysis, I set
τ = 0 and recalibrate the baseline economy so that the credit-t-output ratio is 0.33 as in the
Chilean economy. This is achieved by setting the collateral constraint parameter to λ = 1.4.
This economy has a standard deviation of log (`) equal to 3.27. Since there are no firing
costs, firms adjust labor more and therefore it becomes more volatile. Capital and labor
share of the top 30% are similar to the economy with firing costs.
The counterfactual exercises is the same as in the previous section. That is, I increase the
collateral constraint parameter to λ = 5.35 Table 12 summarizes the impact of the reform
on TFP and the allocation of resources. Importantly, in this economy TFP only goes up by
0.3%. There are two reasons driving this difference. First, the indirect effect is not present
in the economy with no firing costs. Second, the type of firm that are constrained prior to
the reform is different in each economy.
35This implies an external credit-to-output ratio of 1.47 after the reform. I also perform the counterfactual
where I increase λ so that the external credit-to-output ratio is equal to 1.10, and obtain similar results.
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Table 12: Aggregate Changes after Financial Reform, τ = 0.0
Moment Value
%∆TFP 0.3
%∆S.D.MRPK -77.0
%∆S.D.MRPL
0.0
The indirect effect is an important driver of the results. The first row of Table 13 shows
the percentage of constrained firms before and after the reform in each economy. Prior
to the reform, roughly 14 percent of firms are financially constrained in both economies.
This is expected since both are calibrated to have the same external credit-to-GDP ratio.
However, after the reform the fraction of constrained firms in the economy with firing costs
is 2.67 percent, whereas it is 5.25 percent in the economy with no firing costs. After the
reform, firms with good productivity shocks will hire less labor and demand less capital in
the economy with firing costs relative to prior the reform. This is triggered by an increase
in the effective cost of firing a worker due to an increase in the wage of 8 percent. In
the economy with no firing costs, this effect is not present since labor can be costlessly
adjusted.36
36The wage goes up by 15 percent in the economy with no firing costs.
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Table 13: Constrained Firms in Both Economies
Moment Benchmark Economy,
τ = 0.47
No Firing Cost Economy,
τ = 0.0
Collateral Constraint
Parameter
λ = 1.35 λ = 5.0 λ = 1.35 λ = 5.0
% of Financially
Constrained Firms
13.77 2.67 13.85 5.25
Share low z 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.00
The second row of Table 13 shows the share of firms who receive shocks below the 80th
percentile who are financially constrained. This fraction is higher in the economy with firing
costs. This is due to the fact that in the presence of firing costs, there are firms that are
financially constrained because they hoard too much labor and therefore demand a large
amount of capital. Relaxing the problem of this type of firms is important since they have
a larger marginal product of capital relative to the economy with no firing costs.
3.6 Studying Different Economies
In this section I further explore the interaction between firing costs and financial frictions
through two policy experiments. Using the baseline calibration, I first study the effect of
relaxing collateral constraints for economies with different levels of firing costs. Interestingly,
the elasticity of the wage with respect to the collateral constraint parameter plays a key
role in understanding the magnitude of the change in TFP across economies. Second, I
study the effects of an increase in firing costs for economies with different levels of financial
development. I find that economies with higher level of financial development (i.e. higher
λ) suffer a smaller drop on TFP after an increase in firing costs.37
37All the results shown below have to be understood as steady states comparison of different economies.
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3.6.1 Relaxing Collateral Constraints
To examine how firing costs interact with a relaxation of collateral constraints, I do the
following policy exercise. I fix all the parameters of the baseline economy and analyze an
increase in λ from λ = 1.20 to λ = 10.0 for economies with different levels of τ . This change
in the collateral constraint is motivated by the empirical fact that the external credit-to-
output ratio ranges from 0.10 to 1.79.38 This is done for economies with firing costs ranging
from τ = 0 to τ = 1.17, which is equivalent to 14 monthly wages.39 This is the range that
Heckman and Pagés (2003) find for countries in Latin America.
Figure 11: Percentage Change in TFP for Different τ
The effect of the change in the collateral constraint on TFP can be seen in Figure 11.
There is a non monotonical relationship between the increase in TFP from an increase in
λ and the level of the firing cost. This is explained by the increase in the effective cost of
firing a worker (τw) following an increase in the collateral constraint. Figure 12 shows this
38This range is taken from the update of 2018 of the Financial Development and Structure Database (See
Beck et al. (2000).
39Specifically, I analyze firing costs equivalent to 0, 3, 6, 11 and 14 monthly wages.
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change for the economies analyzed.
Figure 12: Percentage Change in Effective Cost of Firing for Different τ
In economies where the firing cost is low, wages go up more since its is less costly to
adjust labor and hence firms demand more labor. In economies with high firing costs, the
wage does not adjust as much since adjusting labor is too costly, but firing costs were high
to begin with. The effective cost of firing increases more in economies with lower firing
costs.40 As a result, the standard deviation of MRPL increases more in such economies as
can be seen from Figure 13.
40The economy with τ = 0 is not depicted in the graph since the effective cost of firing in this economy
is always 0.
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Figure 13: Percentage Change in Standard Deviation of MRPL for Different τ
Due to the indirect effect explained in the previous section the marginal product of
capital drops more in economies with higher levels of τ , as can be seen in Figure 14. This is
an important driver of the larger increase in TFP for such economies. However, the initial
conditions prior to the change in λ are part of the reason why the relation between τ and
the change in TFP is non monotonic. Table 14 reports the share of constrained firms who
receive shocks below the 80th percentile for economies where λ = 1.20. This share first
increases and then decreases as τ increases. Thus, in economies where τ is too low or to
high, this share is lower. When τ is low, it is relatively cheaper for firms to adjust labor and
therefore they fire workers after receiving a bad shock. When τ is large, firms remain small
and therefore do not hoard labor. Hence, the effect on TFP after an increase in λ through
the direct channel is stronger for moderate values of τ .
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Figure 14: Percentage Change in Standard Deviation of MRPK for Different τ
Table 14: Share of Constrained Firms with z Below 80th Percentile, λ = 1.20
Moment τ = 0.0 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.92 τ = 1.17
Share constrained firms
w/low z
0.10 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.07
3.6.2 Increasing Firing Costs
In this section I study an increase in the firing cost for economies with different levels of
financial development. As in the previous subsection I fix all the parameters to the baseline
and increase τ from 0 to 1.17 for economies with different levels of λ. The results of this
analysis are summarized in Figure 15. There is a monotonic relationship between the drop
in TFP after an increase in τ and the level of λ. That is, TFP drops less for higher levels
of the collateral constraint parameter.
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Figure 15: Percentage Change in TFP for Different λ
There are two forces driving this result. On one hand, an increase in firing costs worsens
the allocation of labor but less so in economies with more developed financial markets. On
the other hand, an increase in the firing cost distorts the allocation of capital in economies
with financial frictions, but less so in economies where these frictions are less severe.
Figure 16 depicts the change in standard deviation of MRPL following an increase in
τ . Notice that it increases less in economies with higher λ. Hence, labor is relatively less
distorted after an increase in firing costs in economies were financial markets are more
developed. This is because when the collateral constraint parameter is high, firms do not
have to accumulate net worth to relax their financial constraint, and therefore can use some
of the internal resources to pay for the firing cost and have a better allocation of labor.
59
Figure 16: Percentage Change in Standard Deviation of MRPL for Different λ
The change in the dispersion of MRPK following an increase in τ is shown in Figure 17.
The reason why there is a relatively better allocation of capital is that increasing firing costs
lowers the size of firms with high productivity shocks, and as a result these firms are less
likely to be financially constrained. This effect is stronger in economies where the collateral
constraint parameter is higher.
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Figure 17: Percentage Change in Standard Deviation of MRPK for Different λ
Finally, I explore how the aggregate capital-to-labor ratio changes when firing costs in-
crease in economies with different levels of financial development. I find qualitatively similar
results to the empirical literature that analyzes the joint effect of employment protection
and financial development on firms’ investment. There are studies that find that increas-
ing employment protection generates an increase in the capital-output ratio, and there are
studies that find the opposite. The key distinction between these studies is the types of
economies they analyze. Autor et al. (2007) find that in the U.S. a small increase in the cost
of firing workers (starting from a situation with almost no cost) the capital to labor ratio
increases. As can be seen in Figure 18, in economies with high λ there is a slight increase in
the capital to labor ratio for moderate changes of τ starting from τ = 0. Similarly, Cingano
et al. (2014) study a small increase in employment protection in Italy in 1990 when firms
below the threshold of fifteen employees where no longer exempt from paying severance
payments. They also find a positive relation between the capital-labor ratio and the level of
employment protection. On the contrary, Calcagnini et al. (2009) and Cingano et al. (2010)
find a negative relation between firing costs and capital-labor ratio. These studies make use
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of cross country variation in labor protection legislation across European countries. These
countries are characterized by highly regulated labor markets and a relatively high level of
financial development. Similarly, I find that in economies where λ is relatively high, the
capital-labor ratio is decreasing for large levels of the firing cost. Intuitively, increasing τ
moderately stating from τ = 0 induces firms to hoard labor and hence demand more cap-
ital. However, for larger levels of τ is too costly for firms to hoard labor and do not have
incentives to grow. Hence firms become smaller and demand less capital.
Figure 18: Aggregate Capital-Labor Ratio for Different λ
3.7 Conclusion
The goal of this chapter is to study and quantify the impact of the interaction between
financial frictions and firing costs. In particular, I study the effect of a financial reform in
an economy where firms find it costly to fire workers. To do this, I set up a model with
heterogeneous firms that face both firing costs and collateral constrains. I calibrate the
model using census plant level data from the manufacturing sector in Chile and aggregate
moments. Using the calibrated model, I quantify the long run change in total factor pro-
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ductivity after a financial reform. I find that TFP increases by 2.5% following the reform. If
firing costs are not taken into account in the analysis, after a financial reform TFP increases
by only 0.3%. Acknowledging firing cots is important since it worsens the allocation of
capital prior to the reform and hence the reform has a larger impact on productivity. The
model can qualitatively replicate certain features of the empirical literature. The impact of
firing costs on productivity is smaller in economies with more developed financial markets.
Furthermore, the relationship between the capital-labor ratio and the level of firing costs is
hump-shaped for certain levels of financial development.
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4 Conclusion
The objective of this dissertation is to analyze how government policy affects aggregate
productivity. In particular, how government policy can affect the way resources are allocated
across firms with different levels of productivity, potentially distorting the optimal allocation
of resources.
To be able to quantify these effects, regardless of the type of government policy in mind,
it is important to have detailed plant level information. Chapter 1 describes the data set
used for this purpose. The data set is a plant level census of the manufacturing sector
in Chile with very detailed balance sheet and production information. This data set us
then used in Chapters 2 and 3 to evaluate different government policies and its effects on
aggregate productivity.
In Chapter 2, we study how corporate tax rates affect allocation of resources and aggre-
gate productivity. Corporate tax regulation generates heterogeneity in the effective tax rates
faced by firms due to exemptions, deductions, and deferrals. At the same time, there is a
large amount of dispersion in firm-level productivity even within narrowly defined industries.
As a result, effective corporate tax rates can potentially generate an inefficient allocation of
resources across firms, which directly affects total factor productivity. We document this
dispersion using the data described in Chapter 1. We then develop a monopolistic compe-
tition model that incorporates these findings to quantify the effects of corporate tax rates
in aggregate productivity.
Finally, in Chapter 3, I study the interaction between financial frictions and firing costs
and its impact on aggregate productivity. To do this, I develop a small open economy model
with heterogeneous firms that face collateral constraints and have to pay firing costs. I cal-
ibrate the model using the data described in Chapter 1. I find that aggregate productivity
increases by 2.5 percent following a financial reform that makes Chile’s level of financial de-
velopment comparable to that of the United Kingdom. Ignoring firing costs underestimates
the impact of the reform, predicting an increase in productivity of 0.3 percent. Acknowl-
edging firing costs introduces two reasons why the financial reform has a stronger impact.
First, firms with high past employment hoard labor and, as a result, demand more capital,
which makes them more likely to be financially constrained. Second, an increase in wages
following the reform increases the effective firing cost and hence discourages firms with low
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past employment from hiring. As a result, these firms demand less capital than they would
if there were no firing costs and are less likely to be financially constrained. Finally, I study
the effect on productivity of the interaction between these two frictions when evaluating
labor and financial reforms. I do this for a range of economies with plausible initial levels
of financial development and firing costs.
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Appendix
A Chapter 2 Appendix
A.1 Data Base Creation
We use the manufacturing sector census data from Chile to construct our sample in the
following manner. First, we drop all observations with negative values for output, capital,
wage bill, and profit taxes. We believe these negative values are due to reporting error.
Our model explains that aggregate TFP is affected by the dispersion of marginal revenue
products. For this reason, we trim the 1 percent tails of the observations by the marginal
revenue product of capital,MRPKsi, and the marginal revenue product of labor,MRPLsi.
Then we eliminate the 0.5 percent tails of the observations by physical productivity, Asi.
Last, when we consider counterfactual flat tax rate policies, there are cases in which some
plants have marginal revenue products with negative values, a result that is mathematically
possible but theoretically inconsistent. As a result, we eliminate observations with negative
marginal revenue products for a counterfactual flat tax rate of 20 percent, which is the
highest flat tax level we analyze. If a firm has positive marginal revenue products for this
tax rate, then it also does for a lower flat tax rate. On average, the number of firms that
are eliminated because of this criterion are only 1.7 percent of the total sample.
Table 15 presents the representativeness of our sample with respect to the manufacturing
sector by size category. For value added, the share of firms with more than 200 employees
is 7 percentage points higher in the manufacturing sector than in our sample. On the
contrary, this share is 6 percentage points lower in the manufacturing sector relative to our
sample for firms with 50 to 199 employees. The representativeness of our sample is better
across the three different size categories for employment and the wage bill.
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Table 15: Shares of Total Manufacturing Economic Activity By Size Category (Average for
1998-2007)
Economic Activity:
10 - 49
employees
50 - 199
employees
200+
employees
Share of Value Added:
Sample 0.11 0.26 0.63
Manufacturing Sector 0.10 0.20 0.70
Share of Employment:
Sample 0.19 0.30 0.51
Manufacturing Sector 0.18 0.28 0.54
Share of Wage Bill:
Sample 0.14 0.29 0.57
Manufacturing Sector 0.12 0.26 0.62
Notes. This table only analyzes plants with more than 10 employees since those with less than 10 are underrepresented in the ENIA.
A.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 16: Output gap decomposition: Hours as Labor Input, tsi = 0 (percent)
Year Output Gap TFP Gap
Intersectoral
K
Intersectoral
L
∆Aggregate
Capital
2001 67.93 14.94 -2.50 2.10 53.38
2002 60.80 14.36 -0.81 1.98 45.32
2003 66.75 14.74 -1.78 3.10 50.71
2004 80.08 23.41 -3.88 3.21 57.39
2005 101.54 31.07 -3.95 2.36 72.02
2006 123.91 33.70 -1.40 13.15 78.42
2007 118.84 32.19 -4.47 4.97 86.14
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A.3 Robustness Checks on the Measurement of Effective Tax Rates
Table 17: Output gap decomposition: Loss Carryforward, tsi = 0 (percent)
Output Gap TFP Gap Intersectoral
K
Intersectoral
L
∆Aggregate
Capital
22.99 6.18 0.78 0.74 15.30
Table 18: Distribution of Effective Profit Tax Rates: Permanent Sample (percent)
Year
25th
percentile
50th
percentile
75th
percentile
90th
percentile
Statutory
Tax Rate
Standard
Deviation
2003 2.75 14.46 17.16 24.11 16.5 12.53
2004 8.30 15.56 17.39 22.41 17 11.06
2005 8.43 15.83 17.44 22.36 17 11.52
2006 7.85 15.63 17.31 22.71 17 10.38
2007 8.16 15.87 17.65 24.40 17 13.05
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Figure 19: Relationship between TFP Gap and t¯: Permanent Sample (2003)
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B Chapter 3 Appendix
B.1 Span of Control Parameter
Table 19: Values of Span of Control Parameter for Chile 1995-2007
Moment Value
Min 0.75
Max 1.03
Median 0.85
Mean 0.88
Variance 0.09
Source: authors calculations using the ENIA for
the years 1996 to 2007.
Note: Values are calculated by summing the elasticities
resulting from the production function estimation using
Wooldridge (2009) method.
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